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I. INTRODUCTION 
My colleague and friend Gerald Caplan (Jerry) recently announced his 
retirement. Not only was I saddened to lose a wonderful colleague, but the legal 
academy and  profession have lost a member of a vanishing breed: a thoughtful, 
principled conservative. While I am not a conservative, working with Jerry has 
been an extraordinary experience; his thoughtful approach to the law has 
provided me with a much deeper understanding of the criminal justice system. 
This essay is not simply a profile of Jerry’s career. Anyone interested in 
reviewing his resume can do so.1 Instead, I want to use this essay to explore 
 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; University of 
Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend special thanks to Jerry Caplan for 
so many things, including his friendship, his leadership as McGeorge’s dean for nearly a decade, and for his 
thoughtful criticism of so many of my articles, including this one. I also want to extend special thanks to former 
California Appellate Justice Earl Johnson, Professor Joshua Dressler, and former Dean Ned Spurgeon for their 
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to McGeorge librarian Michele Finerty for 
unearthing numerous helpful documents. Finally, I want to extend my thanks to my research assistant, 
Jacquelyn Loyd, for her tireless work in getting this article ready for publication. 
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examples of Jerry’s work as a lawyer to demonstrate how far talk radio pundits 
and those claiming the conservative mantel have moved away from their claimed 
predecessors: responsible, public-minded conservatives. Jerry’s views are closer 
to those of classic conservative thinkers like Edmund Burke than to the right 
wingers who try to claim the title of conservative today.2 
Part II provides a brief discussion of Jerry’s role as a Washington insider. 
That section focuses on his role in helping to preserve the Legal Services 
Corporation when it was under attack from the right wing.3 Afterward, I explore 
two areas where Jerry’s work illustrates his role in advancing the legal dialogue 
in important ways. Part III discusses Jerry’s widely cited and deeply provocative 
article on Miranda v. Arizona.4 Part IV discusses guidelines that Jerry developed 
in the early 1970s to govern police practices in the District of Columbia.5 Those 
guidelines came at a time when the Burger Court began dismantling the Warren 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.6 They are instructive: the Burger 
Court, led by Justice Rehnquist, seldom found a search it did not like.7 As argued 
below, that case law has led to a great deal of arbitrary police activity, 
unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment (including racial profiling).8 By 
contrast, Jerry’s work demonstrated a balance between support for the police and 
thoughtful regulation of their conduct.9 At the core, Jerry’s thought emerges: 
unlike current members of the right, Jerry did not believe that government was 
the problem.10 Instead, although he believed in less government than liberal 
colleagues, he believed in good government and worked to advance that goal.11 
  
 
1. Resume of Gerald Caplan, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 
available at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Faculty/geraldCaplanCV.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
2. See generally JESSE NORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE FIRST CONSERVATIVE 282 (2013) (describing 
Burke as “the first conservative”); John Derbyshire, How Radio Wrecks the Right, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Feb. 
23, 2009), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/how-radio-wrecks-the-right/ (noting, despite the author’s 
conservative views, “‘Reason has been overwhelmed by propaganda, ideas by slogans.’ Talk radio has 
contributed mightily to this development.” (quoting E.J. Dionne)). 
3. Infra Part II. 
4. Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Infra Part III. 
5. Infra Part IV. 
6. Infra Part IV.C. 
7. See James J. Tomkovicz, Rehnquist’s Fourth: A Portrait of the Justice as a Law and Order Man, 82 
MISS. L.J. 359, 369 (2013) (identifying 205 Fourth Amendment cases on which Rehnquist voted, 166 of which 
were pro-law enforcement, roughly 85%). 
8. Infra Part IV.C. 
9. Infra Part IV.B. 
10. Infra Part IV.C. 
11. Infra Part IV.C. 
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II. A WASHINGTON INSIDER 
Prior to accepting appointment as the Dean of McGeorge School of Law in 
1992, Jerry was a Washington insider for most of his career.12 Before and after a 
stint as a Professor of Law at Arizona State University,13 Jerry held various posts 
in Washington, most often in areas dealing with criminal justice.14 Of particular 
interest for this article was his service as general counsel to the District of 
Columbia Police Department;15 Director of the Philadelphia Police Performance 
Study Commission;16 and consultant to the U.S. Department of Justice to review 
the use of force by the Los Angeles Police Department.17 I cite these various 
appointments not only to demonstrate that Jerry had a distinguished career and 
was a Washington insider. He surely did have a distinguished career and 
certainly was a Washington insider, able to move easily from one administrative 
position to another. As is evident when you walk into his office, he was 
appointed by Republican Presidents to most of his positions.18 He worked with 
many prominent Republican officials throughout his career and viewed many of 
them with a kind eye, as demonstrated in his essay about former Attorney 
General John Mitchell.19 I also cite these examples because, with a bit of research 
into the work that he did, one becomes aware of his integrity and open-minded 
approach to the issues at hand. 
For example, the President’s Crime Commission produced a highly regarded, 
balanced approach to crime control and evaluation of crime.20 Jerry’s service 
 
12. See Resume of Gerald Caplan, supra note 1, at 1. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. After serving as an Assistant United States Attorney, Caplan served as a staff attorney for the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Id. Subsequent appointments 
included a staff position with the White House Task Force on Crime, executive assistant to the D.C. Director of 
Public Safety, and senior researcher at the Urban Institute. Id. Notably, he served as the Director of the National 
Institute of Justice, within the Department of Justice, for four years. Id. From 1977 until 1992, he was a 
Professor of Law at George Washington University’s National Law Center. Id. During that period, he also 
served in various roles within the government. Id. For example, he served as the Deputy Director of the Bureau 
of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 2. 
18. See Profile Page of Gerald Caplan, UNIV.PACIFIC, MCGEORGE SCH.L., http://www.mcgeorge.edu/ 
Gerald_Caplan.htm?display=FullBio (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(indicating that Gerald Caplan was appointed as the Director of the National Institute of Justice by Attorney 
General Elliot Richardson in 1973, during the Nixon Presidency); Mixed Signals at Legal Services, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 20, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/20/opinion/mixed-signals-at-legal-services.html (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the Reagan administration appointed Gerald Caplan as acting president 
of the Legal Services Corporation). 
19. Gerald Caplan, The Making of the Attorney General: John Mitchell and the Crimes of Watergate 
Reconsidered, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 311 (2010) (reviewing JAMES ROSEN, THE STRONG MAN (2008)). 
20. See generally Special Message from Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, to Congress 
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (Mar. 8, 1965), available at http://www.presidency. 
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investigating the Philadelphia Police and Los Angeles police forces won him 
bipartisan praise for his fairness.21 
The best measure of Jerry’s brand of conservatism and commitment to our 
justice system is the work that he did as Acting Director of the Legal Services 
Corporation (the Corporation).22 Although conservative activists had yet to 
achieve the destructive energy demonstrated by current members of the right, like 
Tea Party politicians, they were beginning to gain traction in Washington with 
the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. The Corporation was in the crosshairs of 
many activist groups, including the Pacific Legal Foundation23 and the Heritage 
Foundation.24 Howard Phillips and the organization that he created, the National 
Defeat Legal Services Committee, later called the Legal Services Reform 
Coalition, were even more ardent in their opposition to the Corporation.25 While 
organizations like the Heritage Foundation and the Pacific Legal Foundation had 
other targets, Phillips and his allies had one primary target: the Corporation and 
its lawyers.26 
A brief word of history is in order: while the Corporation was created in 
1974 when Richard Nixon was president, its origins date back to Lyndon 
Johnson’s administration.27 As part of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) created local legal service programs 
throughout the United States and funded already existing local legal aid societies, 
previously dependent on private charity for their support.28 Those programs were 
 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26800 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (Feb. 1967) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND CRIME (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L. Gabbidon 
eds., 2009). 
21. See PHILA. POLICE STUDY TASK FORCE, PHILADELPHIA AND ITS POLICE: TOWARD A NEW 
PARTNERSHIP (Mar. 1987) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Gerald Caplan, Evaluation Design for 
Operation Rollout (Mar. 7, 1980) (unpublished evaluation) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Phil 
Kerby, It Wasn’t a Good Week for LAPD, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1980 (discussing Caplan’s report on the L.A. 
Police Department); Letter from Jerome A. Barron, Dean, George Washington Univ., to Gerald M. Caplan, 
Professor, George Washington Univ. (July 8, 1980) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (praising Caplan 
for his work investigating the L.A.P.D.). 
22. Mixed Signals at Legal Services, supra note 18. 
23. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Coast Lawyer Reported as Legal Aid Choice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/08/us/coast-lawyer-reported-as-legal-aid-choice.html?pagewanted=print 
(reporting that one of the new appointees to the Corporation board came from the politically opposed Pacific 
Legal Foundation). 
24. See KENNETH F. BOEHM & PETER T. FLAHERTY, HERITAGE FOUND., WHY THE LEGAL SERVICES 
CORPORATION MUST BE ABOLISHED 2 (Oct. 18, 1995), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
1995/10/bg1057nbsp-why-the-legal-services-corporation (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
25.  See EARL JOHNSON JR., TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL LEGAL 
AID IN THE UNITED STATES 506–07, 760 (2014). 
26. Id. 
27. See id. at 54 (noting that the Office of Economic Opportunity was formed under Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
leadership). 
28. See id. at 54–55; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, S. 2642, 88th Cong., 78 Stat. 508 (1964). 
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designed to provide legal services for the poor.29 As the Nixon administration 
dismantled the OEO, Congress eventually created the Corporation to take over 
the function of providing counsel to the poor.30 
The Corporation earned the enmity of the right wing for a number of reasons. 
Often, community legal service attorneys sued state officials for violations of 
federal law.31 Further, local offices often brought class action suits to attack 
underlying difficulties faced by the poor.32 Frequently, at least from the 
perspective of business interests, government-paid lawyers were pursuing overtly 
political goals.33 In a recently published three volume history of civil legal aid in 
the United States, former state appellate Justice Earl Johnson argues that labeling 
the Corporation’s actions as “political” was itself a counter-attack on legal 
services attorneys who were properly representing their clients.34 
In a short article on the Corporation, Jerry summed up the animosity: “A full-
page photograph from a recent issue of the Conservative Digest displays empty 
offices at the Legal Services Corporation. The offices are vacant as the result of 
recent budget cuts. The picture is captioned: ‘Heart-Warming Photo of the Month 
(Maybe of the Decade).’”35 
Even before he became President, Ronald Reagan opposed federal subsidies 
for indigent legal services.36 One of his first acts as President was to attempt to 
kill the Corporation by de-funding it.37 Later, he replaced all of the Corporation’s 
board members with his own nominees and tried to nominate Ronald Zumbrun, 
the President of the right-wing Pacific Legal Foundation, as its chair.38 Reagan 
was forced to withdraw Zumbrun’s nomination, but made a recess appointment 
of William J. Olson as chair.39 As part of Reagan’s transition team, Olson 
purportedly recommended the abolition of the Corporation.40 
 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 451. 
31. See, e.g., Mixed Signals at Legal Services, supra note 18. 
32. Id. 
33. See David Shribman, Legal Agency Warns It May Cut Local Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/24/us/legal-agency-warns-it-may-cut-local-funds.html (quoting Gerald Caplan, 
“If the program had not become so highly polarized, this would be seen not as a sinister plot but, rather, just solid 
fiscal management.”). 
34. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 509–10 (noting that Reagan had a highly visible dispute with California 
Rural Legal Assistance in the past). 
35. Gerald M. Caplan, Understanding the Controversy over the Legal Services Corporation, 28 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 583, 583 (1983). 
36. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Scorned Legal Services Corp. on the Rebound, WASH. POST, July 21, 1982, 
at A21. 
37. Id. 
38. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 538, 558; Taylor, supra note 23; Mixed Signals at Legal Services, supra 
note 18. 
39. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 536–38. 
40. Id. at 544, 546. 
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Over the next year or so, Reagan battled to get his board members 
confirmed.41 The Senate did not reject all of his nominees; fifty-two senators 
wrote the President to tell him that they were ready to confirm six of his eight 
nominees.42 They were not ready to confirm two: Olson and William Harvey, the 
board chair.43 Reagan responded by withdrawing his nominees, and from 1983 
through mid-1985, he made recess appointments to run the organization.44 During 
a period of charges and countercharges about the legality of the Corporation’s 
actions and excessive fees charged by Reagan appointees on the board, the 
Senate rejected the President’s nominees, forcing him to make recess 
appointments for several years.45 
Appointed as the acting director in March 1982, Jerry took over the 
Corporation at a politically sensitive time.46 A short article in the New York Times 
summed up the situation: “President Reagan’s war of attrition against the Legal 
Services Corporation continues apace.”47 It cited Reagan’s efforts to defund the 
Corporation and to appoint “interim directors who have been remarkably 
noncommittal about their dedication to its work.”48 But, noted the Times, “to 
[board members’] credit, however, they decided recently to appoint a 
sympathetic veteran of the program—Professor Gerald Caplan of the George 
Washington University law faculty—as acting president.”49 
Several months into Jerry’s tenure, the Washington Post ran a story about the 
Corporation, captioned Scorned Legal Services Corp. on the Rebound.50 The 
story quoted Jerry to the effect that, while the Corporation faced continuing 
funding questions, “they are not life-and-death matters.”51 Less visible from the 
public record is how Jerry maneuvered within the Corporation to achieve 
compromise, curtailing some of the discretion exercised by field attorneys, but 
undercutting some of the bases for criticism of the Corporation.52 One gets a hint 
of what went on by reading what Jerry wrote about the Corporation shortly after 
he stepped down as the acting director.53 
 
41. Id. at 558. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 560–64. 
46. Id. at 539; see also Caplan Named Acting President, POVERTY LAW TODAY (Legal Servs. Corp., 
Wash., D.C.), Spring 1982, at 1. 
47. Mixed Signals at Legal Services, supra note 18. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Kristof, supra note 36. 
51. Id. 
52. See e.g. Caplan, supra note 35, at 588 (tempering the operation of the Corporation by working against 
extreme views: “Representing poor people in their individual problems is challenge enough.”). 
53. Gerald M. Caplan, Shold Reagan Kill Legal Services?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1982. 
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He laid out his position in an op-ed in the December 9, 1982 edition of the 
Wall Street Journal: he cited examples where attorneys working for the 
Corporation became politicized, opposing the Reagan administration.54 For 
instance, he described grassroots efforts to organize the Corporation’s clients to 
support pro-consumer legislation or candidates.55 Although acknowledging that 
such causes may be just, Jerry admitted “[such efforts] constitute partisan 
political action and should not be tax-supported.”56 He cited examples of sloppy 
oversight within the Corporation, like the lack of attention to whether prospective 
clients met eligibility requirements.57 Preventing audits by outsiders left the 
Corporation open to controversy.58 He was, in effect, calling out lawyers and 
administrators within the Corporation for giving their enemies bases for attacking 
them. 
At the same time, he argued forcefully that the examples cited by critics of 
the Corporation were peripheral to its core function. The case for legal services, 
he argued, was a strong one: “There are poor people, they do have legal needs, 
and to remit them to the volunteer efforts of the bar, private charities or the 
competition for state funds is to leave them largely unrepresented . . . .”59 He also 
observed that some of the criticism of legal services attorneys focused on their 
use of the legal system to frustrate their opponents through aggressive 
representation.60 His response was straightforward: don’t blame legal services 
attorneys for the excesses of our litigation system.61 
The most striking aspect of his defense of legal services attorneys is worth 
quoting at length: 
For all their self-proclaimed radicalism, Legal Services attorneys accept 
the system. They really believe that a day in court is worth having, that 
the poor can get a fair shake in the legislature, that our laws will not 
invariably be bent to favor the strong. This is not the stuff of revolution; 
it is fodder for democracy. 
The fact is that over the years, the Legal Services program has moderated 
the impulses of those who are intolerant or ignorant of democratic 
processes or who see violence as a means of getting their way. By its 
nature it binds the poor to strategies of ordered change. It integrates them 
into the body politic. It provides a taste of democracy. 
 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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Perhaps this should be enough to guarantee the continuation of the 
[C]orporation.62 
No doubt, sentiments like those expressed in his op-ed suggest why Jerry 
managed to alienate the political foes of the Corporation. Before I turn to the 
larger significance that I read into his public statements about the Corporation, 
examining another publicly reported event during Jerry’s tenure as acting director 
demonstrates his willingness to confront powerful opponents of the Corporation, 
with little caution about whatever political ambitions he may have had. 
During his tenure, Jerry alienated some board members by challenging the 
bills that they submitted for their time.63 As reported in the Washington Post, 
Jerry warned board members that their consulting fees and expenses were high 
and were sure to invite criticism.64 These were Reagan appointees, the kinds of 
political allies Jerry might want if he had been less moved by his obligation as a 
fiduciary than by ambition. Even the story in the Post, reporting the response of 
board members, suggested that Jerry earned political enemies among board 
members.65 Although technically Jerry resigned from his position, his resignation 
came after pressure from the board.66 
His willingness to expose the Reagan administration continued after he left 
his position. He continued to challenge efforts to abolish the Corporation and 
characterized Reagan’s efforts to dismantle the Corporation as “a holy war 
between traditional Republicans and the radical right.”67 He defiantly 
contradicted White House spokesman Larry Speakes when Speakes denied that 
the White House was trying to abolish the Corporation.68 
While Jerry’s leadership was not the only reason that the Corporation 
survived, his role was significant.69 Working with the board, Jerry helped 
depoliticize the program, tempering Corporation attorneys’ enthusiasm for 
engaging in political activities. While raising questions about engaging in 
legislative advocacy and the use of class actions in his writings about the work of 
the Corporation,70 Jerry did not end those practices.71 Jerry helped stop 
 
62. Id. 
63. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 540 (describing Jerry’s refusal to sign board chair Bill Harvey’s travel 
expense forms). 
64. Mary Thornton, Report Clears Legal Services Board Members, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1983, at A3. 
65. Id. 
66. See JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 549–51 (noting that Harvey attempted to fire Caplan at one point). 
Caplan experienced great resistance from board members and the Reagan administration alike. Id. 
67. Ronald J. Ostrow, Administration Assailed Over Legal Aid, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1982, at I8 (quoting 
Gerald Caplan). 
68. Id. 
69. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 540–41 (describing Caplan’s efforts to reorganize the Corporation’s staff 
and his growing relationship with Lyons, his eventual replacement). 
70. See Caplan, supra note 35, at 586–87 (conceding that class action lawsuits can be good things, but 
should not be supported by taxpayers). 
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momentum to defund the Corporation; arguing for a return to a less political 
mission undercut some of the fury on the right.72 Importantly, he moderated the 
board, he restrained its most conservative members, and he educated some critics 
of the Corporation that the organization was not doing what Reagan had claimed 
its lawyers were doing.73 
I draw a number of lessons from Jerry’s role as the director of the 
Corporation. As mentioned above, he acted with integrity by refusing to buckle 
under pressure from powerful politicians.74 But I see something more important 
related to my overall theme: Jerry’s stance was that of a principled conservative. 
One might argue that his service as director demonstrates that he, in fact, was 
not a conservative at all, but a centrist or a closet-liberal. Certainly, by 
comparison to contemporary politicians who attempt to claim the conservative 
mantel, like prominent Republican Paul Ryan,75 Jerry looks downright 
progressive. One can hardly imagine Rush Limbaugh or Paul Ryan rushing to 
defend the core mission of the Corporation.76 
To be clear, while I respect Jerry’s position that some Corporation attorneys 
exceeded their authority and engaged in partisan politics, one can defend the 
actions of those attorneys as a function of their primary obligation to their 
clients.77 Further, given the limited resources available to legal service 
organizations, using those devices expanded the influence of the Corporation in 
the service of their clients. In effect, the debate between Jerry and liberals would 
be about the meaning of zealous representation of one’s clients.78 A closely 
related issue is the complex question about who a legal service lawyer’s client is: 
 
71. Despite Corporation opponents’ challenges to class action suits, those survived during Jerry’s tenure 
at the Corporation, and were only ended in 1996. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 758. Led by Newt Gingrich and 
members of Congress elected under the “Contract with America” banner, Congress enacted a series of 
restrictions on Corporation lawyers, including a ban on class actions. Id. 
72. See id. at 540. Jerry was not alone in opposing the President’s efforts to defund the Corporation—
Congress, led by Republican Senator Warren Rudman, fought the President as well. Id. at 579–80. While the 
Corporation’s funding was reduced significantly, it survived. Id. 
73. Id. at 540–42; Ostrow, supra note 67. 
74. Ostrow, supra note 67; see also JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 538–39. 
75. See e.g. Jeanne Sahadi & Rich Barbieri, What’s in Paul Ryan’s Budget, CNN MONEY (Mar. 12, 
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/12/news/economy/paul-ryan-budget/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (noting Ryan’s budget fails to account for spending on emergency relief, cuts Medicare expenses, and 
increases defense spending); Ralph E. Wall, List of Republican Cuts in Paul Ryan’s Plan, FREE REPUBLIC 
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/2936027/posts (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (listing all the various programs one of Ryan’s budget proposals planned to cut). 
76. See Wall, supra note 75 (indicating a planned $420 million cut to the Legal Services Corporation in 
Paul Ryan’s 2012 budget proposal). 
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (outlining a lawyer’s obligation to act with diligence 
regarding his or her client); see generally id. R. 1. 
78. See Paul C. Saunders, Whatever Happened to ‘Zealous Advocacy’?, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 2011 
(discussing the longstanding debate about whether zealous advocacy is mandated by ethical responsibilities or 
whether it is used as a weapon against opponents). 
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the poor person who walks in the door of the legal services office or the 
government that pays for the attorney’s services?79 
Even if liberals might disagree with Jerry’s position about whether 
Corporation lawyers overstepped their bounds, one might still characterize Jerry 
as a moderate. After all, the position he took in the 1980s would hardly endear 
him to members of the right wing today.80 But despite efforts by talk show hosts 
and members of the radical right to claim the title of conservative, language has 
fixed meaning. 
Serious scholars consider Edmund Burke “The First Conservative.”81 They 
often invoke his name as an example of conservative thought. But as E.J. Dionne 
pointed out in a recent editorial in the Washington Post, Burke’s positions are 
often glossed over in contemporary discussions.82 Burke had his critics, like Tom 
Paine, who “saw Burke as an apologist for the privileged.”83 But Burke’s views 
were far more nuanced than that. Yes, Burke believed in tradition and in the 
preservation of the social order.84 Not surprisingly, he was opposed to the French 
Revolution.85 Instead, as Burke’s supporters argue, he stood for moderation and 
reform, rather than revolution.86 
Unlike many on the right today, Burke was not a proponent of small 
government.87 Instead, he was a proponent of good government, but thought that 
one must be cautious about how much politics could accomplish.88 According to 
Jesse Norman, Burke’s recent biographer, Burke would have rejected the current 
conservative belief in a society of greed.89 Norman argues he would have rejected 
an ideology that “causes people to lose sight of the real social sources of human 
well-being and to become more selfish and individualistic . . . .”90 Almost sixty 
years ago, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. offered a similar view of Burke, who, 
according to Schlesinger, believed in a society “where power implies 
responsibility and where all classes should be united in harmonious union by a 
 
79. See Carl Horowitz, New Evidence Shows Fraud, Inefficiency Among Legal Services Grantees, NAT’L 
LEGAL & POL’Y CTR. (Jul. 23, 2010), http://nlpc.org/stories/2010/07/23/new-evidence-shows-fraud-inefficiency-
among-grantees (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that the Corporation has put other interests 
over helping the poor). 
80. JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 538–39. 
81. See generally NORMAN, supra note 2. 
82. E.J. Dionne Jr., Edmund Burke Has a Lot to Teach Today’s Conservatives, WASH. POST (June 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-edmund-burke-has-a-lot-to-teach-todays-conservatives/ 
2013/06/30/10f8c95c-e1b5-11e2-a11e-c2ea876a8f30_story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. NORMAN, supra note 2, at 136. 
86. See id. at 282–84. 
87. Dionne, supra note 82. 
88. Id. 
89. See NORMAN, supra note 2, at 30. 
90. Id. at 285. 
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sense of common trust and mutual obligation.”91 Similar to Adam Smith’s views, 
Burke believed in collective responsibility.92 
Jerry’s defense of the Corporation echoed Burke’s view. Like Burke, he 
rejected radical solutions to social problems, but he did not believe that poor 
people should be left to fend for themselves.93 Similar to Burke’s belief that 
“power implies responsibility,”94 Jerry insisted that forcing the poor to resolve 
their legal problems by means of pro-bono volunteer work or other charities 
would amount to an absence of representation of the poor.95 He envisioned a 
meaningful role for government to help people in need.96 While he did not expect 
an organization like the Corporation to solve all the problems of the poor, he 
demonstrated a concern for the less fortunate and saw a role for the government 
to aid others.97 
Also, consistent with Burke’s ideology, Jerry viewed the role of the 
Corporation as advancing slow democratic reform, not revolutionary change. 
This is reflected in his Wall Street Journal op-ed, where he concluded, “the Legal 
Services program has moderated the impulses of those who are intolerant or 
ignorant of democratic processes or who see violence as a means of getting their 
way. By its nature it binds the poor to strategies of ordered change. It integrates 
them into the body politic.”98 Notice also the similarity between Jerry’s position 
and Schlesinger’s reading of Burke’s view that we should be united across class 
lines in “a sense of common trust and mutual obligation.”99 
Some commentators have made similar points about politicians on the right 
today. Indeed, two respected authors, including Norman J. Orenstein, a resident 
scholar at the Heritage Foundation, have placed much of the blame for the 
current state of dysfunction in Washington on extremists in the Republican Party 
like Ann Coulter, who have ratcheted up rhetoric and misinformation.100 No 
doubt, we would benefit from having more individuals of Jerry’s stature serving 
in government, representing traditional values. 
Jerry’s retirement from McGeorge also means that we are losing a reasoned, 
intelligent conservative voice in the legal academy. Some commentators claim 
that the legal academy suffers from liberal bias.101 While those authors were 
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modest about the implications of their study, others have been less measured in 
their response. For example, author Walter Olson accuses “law schools [of 
being] . . . incubator[s] of liberal politics.”102 While John McGinnis, one of co-
authors of the study that concluded that there is a liberal bias in the legal 
academy, was temperate in his article; he endorsed Olson’s conclusion in a book 
review:  
To meet the need for intellectual respectability, Mr. Olson implies, 
professors became engineers of reform.  
. . . . 
Mr. Olson superbly describes the rise of legal clinics, the law-school 
component ostensibly designed to give students hands-on training. He 
notes that the charitable foundations that first funded these clinics were 
more concerned with creating turbines of social change than with 
educating students. These days, many more clinics engage in public-
interest litigation (defined by a rather predictable liberal agenda) than 
devote themselves to matters like the legal ordeals of small 
businesses . . . .103 
McGinnis also supports Olson’s observation that such public interest 
organizations receive substantial funding. He quotes Olson’s observation that the 
liberal “Brennan Center at New York University . . . comes to roughly 80% of 
that of the Federalist Society, the national organization of legal conservatives that 
is routinely vilified by Democratic politicians for its inordinate—and, of course, 
pernicious—effect on our legal culture.”104 
Not only does McGinnis’ tone suggest a difference from Jerry’s approach to 
serious intellectual topics, but it suggests a different view of the role of law and 
the commitment to the less able. Why, for example, would McGinnis favor help 
for small businesses that have access to considerable assistance from the Small 
Business Administration and have powerful support among wealthy 
organizations like the Chamber of Commerce?105 More importantly, McGinnis 
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and Olson’s view that there is something illegitimate about law schools funding 
clinics for the poor is not consistent with traditional values reflected in Burke’s 
work and so thoughtfully defended in Jerry’s writing.106 
For many of us, former President George W. Bush made the concept of 
“compassionate conservatism” an oxymoron.107 But thinkers like Burke reflect 
that tradition, one that Jerry adopted and one that we will miss in the legal 
academy. 
III. MIRANDA 
Miranda v. Arizona108 remains one of the most famous cases in the Supreme 
Court’s history and was, in its time, one of the most controversial.109 So 
unpopular with many Americans, it contributed to the election of Richard Nixon 
in 1968.110 Scholars have recognized Jerry’s article taking issue with Miranda as 
a major contribution to the debate surrounding that case.111 For purposes of my 
theme, it also demonstrates an extraordinary example of how different Jerry’s 
brand of conservatism is from more strident critics. 
This section provides a brief review of the road to Miranda and the 
controversy surrounding the decision.112 It then turns to Jerry’s objections to the 
Court’s holding.113 Finally, it explores Jerry’s nuanced discussion of alternatives 
to Miranda, which are arguably both more principled than Miranda and more 
protective of suspects than current Miranda doctrine.114 
A. The Road to Miranda 
Miranda’s critics often ignore the Court’s legitimate concerns that gave rise 
to the case. Starting with the remarkable decision in Brown v. Mississippi, the 
Supreme Court reviewed many cases involving aggressive police practices in 
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death penalty cases. 115 Many of those cases involved racial injustice in the south, 
where defendants were often coerced to confess under threat of physical force.116 
At times, fear of lynching was close to the surface.117 Over a 30-year period 
between Brown and Miranda, the Court decided more than a case a year.118 
Not only were the cases fraught with concern about racial injustice, but the 
cases did not lend themselves to clear rules.119 As one commentator famously 
stated, under the Court’s test “[a]lmost everything was relevant, but almost 
nothing was decisive.”120 The Court gave little deference to lower court findings 
that could have immunized the trial court’s findings from appellate review.121 The 
lack of deference expanded the Court’s role in reviewing the lower court’s 
holdings.122 
In 1964, the Court decided two cases that suggested that the Court was about 
to hold that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached pre-indictment and 
extended to the interrogation room.123 Escobedo v. Illinois’s reasoning seemed to 
apply broadly but its holding was narrowly framed to describe the unique facts of 
the case. 124 
As a result, not surprisingly, lower courts struggled to understand the scope 
of the Court’s holding in Escobedo.125 Two years later, the Court granted 
certiorari in several cases to resolve the conflict among lower courts.126 
Chief Justice Warren’s Miranda opinion spoke in sweeping terms, unlike 
Escobedo.127 Importantly, the narrow majority found that the Fifth Amendment 
right to be free from compelled testimony extended to the stationhouse.128 
Leaving it open to criticism that the holding read more like legislation than a 
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judicial opinion,129 the Court established a set of procedural rules designed to 
protect the underlying right that the Court had just expanded to the 
stationhouse.130 
More recent commentary has demonstrated that the Court’s holding was a 
compromise and that some justices could have gone further, requiring 
consultation with counsel before interrogation could be conducted.131 But at the 
time, the right argued that Miranda was a major and unwarranted departure from 
precedent and from the Constitution.132 For example, despite the Chief Justice’s 
reassurances that Miranda would enhance fact-finding reliability,133 the dissent134 
and critics135 argued that confessions, a necessary and legitimate law enforcement 
tool, would dry up. Critics argued that the Court lacked support in the Fifth 
Amendment for its holding, both as a matter of history and precedent.136 Not only 
did the Fifth Amendment not apply in the stationhouse, but the procedures 
announced were not constitutional.137 
The Chief Justice’s opinion invited some of the criticism. For example, he 
acknowledged that under the Court’s voluntariness case law, the defendants’ 
statements would have been admissible,138 raising the question of the Court’s 
constitutional authority to render such statements inadmissible: if the police did 
not coerce the statement, and the underlying right was to be free from being 
compelled to be a witness against oneself, how could the Court justify excluding 
the statement?139 Also leaving the Court open to criticism was the Chief Justice’s 
statement that states and Congress could come up with alternatives to the 
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Miranda warnings.140 That is, if the warnings are not mandated by the 
Constitution, how can those procedures be applied to the states?141 
As indicated, Richard Nixon made law and order an issue in his 1968 
presidential campaign.142 In rapid succession, Nixon was able to make four 
appointments to the Court in his first two years in office.143 Chief Justice Warren 
and Justices Black and Fortas, three of the five justices in the Miranda majority, 
left the Court and were replaced by the new Chief, Warren Burger, and Justices 
Blackmun and Powell.144 Only Justice Rehnquist replaced a dissenting justice in 
Miranda, Justice Harlan.145 Although not without fits and starts, the post-Warren 
Court era has been marked by efforts to cabin and narrow Miranda,146 
culminating with an unsuccessful effort to overrule it in Dickerson v. United 
States.147 
Ironically, by 2000 when the Court decided Dickerson, some early critics and 
supporters had switched sides: some liberals expressed dissatisfaction with 
Miranda, or at least the post-Warren Court narrow version of Miranda.148 Many 
critics of Miranda, including some representatives of the police and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, made their peace with the decision, no doubt because the police 
learned to live with the decision.149 Especially in light of post-Miranda case law 
narrowing its application, the police have been able to secure confessions in 
significant numbers of cases.150 
B. Questioning Miranda 
Many scholars recognize Jerry’s article Questioning Miranda as one of the 
best articles on the topic and the best conservative critique of the case.151 While 
he shared the reservations of other conservatives about the decision, his critique 
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is far more nuanced. Indeed, as developed below, were the Court to take his 
proposed alternatives to Miranda seriously, defendants might end up with more 
vigorous protections than they have now under the modern narrow view of 
Miranda.152 
This section initially discusses Miranda’s most visible critic, law professor 
and former United States District Court Judge Paul Cassell. It then explores 
Jerry’s compelling article on Miranda and suggests that Jerry’s views are more 
consonant with traditional conservative principles than more modern scholars 
who claim the conservative mantel. 
Professor Cassell, then a professor of law at the University of Utah, was the 
intellectual leader of the efforts to overrule Miranda.153 A member of the Reagan 
Justice Department and early member of the Federalist Society, he has been an 
outspoken supporter of the death penalty and doubts that the United States has 
executed innocent people.154 Appearing on national television, he stated that the 
idea that innocent people have been put to death is an “urban legend.”155 
Cassell demonstrated a similar bulldog approach to Miranda. In a 
prominently placed law review article, he argued that Miranda has resulted in 
dismissal of charges against large numbers of felons.156 For example, “in 1993, 
Miranda produced roughly 28,000 lost cases against suspects for index violent 
crimes and 79,000 lost cases against suspects for index property crimes.”157 He 
argued that more than 500,000 non-index crimes were lost in a single calendar 
year because of Miranda.158 A number of serious scholars have rebutted this data, 
including then University of Chicago Law Professor Stephen Schulhofer and 
University of Stanford Law Professor and economist John Donohue.159 
An advocate-scholar,160 Cassell urged the government to invigorate 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501,161 a statute enacted by Congress two years after Miranda that would have 
returned the law to the pre-Miranda totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness 
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test.162 Congress enacted the provision in reaction to Chief Justice Warren’s 
statement in Miranda that indicated that Congress and states could enact 
alternative protections to those established in Miranda.163 Between 1968 and the 
late 1990s, federal prosecutors had ignored section 3501 on the belief that it was 
unconstitutional.164 
Working with the conservative Washington Legal Foundation, Cassell 
looked for cases around the country that might be suitable vehicles in which to 
argue for the application of section 3501 as a substitute for Miranda.165 Cassell 
filed amicus curiae briefs in a number of cases, but his arguments did not find a 
favorable audience.166 After Justice Scalia referred favorably to section 3501 in 
Davis v. United States, Cassell’s cause found more support.167 Cassell finally 
found the case he needed: United States v. Dickerson.168 Because neither the 
Justice Department nor Dickerson’s attorney was willing to defend the 
application of section 3501, Cassell presented the issue to the Supreme Court.169 
In effect, his brief argued that section 3501 controlled and that Miranda should 
be overruled.170 
As indicated above, the Supreme Court rejected that position, and it did so by 
a 7–2 vote.171 No one can call Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion a 
resounding endorsement of Miranda.172 From early in his career, Rehnquist was 
an ardent foe of Miranda, seemingly ready to overrule it in a number of cases.173 
In Dickerson, he argued in a somewhat backwards manner that Miranda was 
constitutionally based.174 A few years later, he went back to calling it a 
prophylactic decision, the argument that led many to believe that Miranda lacked 
a constitutional basis.175 But the Chief Justice’s opinion was a reflection of how 
established Miranda had become: now “embedded in routine police practice,” the 
warnings are “part of our national culture.”176 
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Even after Dickerson, Cassell continued to write critically about Miranda. In 
an article published in the Michigan Law Review, he repeated much of his 
critique with special criticism aimed at the Court’s decision in Dickerson.177 He 
did argue that the Court should be open to alternatives to the warnings, notably to 
requiring police to video confessions.178 In such a case, the suppression court 
could make independent factual findings.179 
In contrast to some of Miranda’s critics, Jerry’s Questioning Miranda is 
more balanced, respectful of other points of view, and more scholarly. His 
nuanced approach is more consonant with the kind of conservatism found in 
Edmund Burke’s writings than are the writings of modern scholars on the right. 
No doubt, some of Miranda’s critics have relied on some of Jerry’s 
arguments.180 But most miss the nuance of his position. Making that point 
requires an examination of the major points in his Vanderbilt article, Questioning 
Miranda.181 
Questioning Miranda was grounded in several principles and called for 
reconsideration of that decision. Unlike many foes of Miranda, however, Jerry’s 
article recommended a number of robust alternatives to Miranda warnings.182 
His article starts with a review of the pre-Miranda perspective, the role of 
government in safeguarding its citizenry, and the need for questioning a 
suspect.183 Further, confession was “viewed as the turning point in a criminal’s 
life,” when accompanied by remorse, “it marked the beginning of 
rehabilitation.”184 Confession recognizes the moral order and the importance of 
honesty.185 
Recognizing the need for interrogation, the law imposed relatively few 
restraints on interrogation, but provided some limitations. While some pressuring 
of a suspect was proper, the voluntariness test protected against abuse.186 The test 
did not create a special duty to inform a suspect of his right to refuse to 
incriminate himself, but the awareness of the right to resist participation was 
relevant to a finding of voluntariness.187 Tolerance of police practices that 
imposed some pressure on a suspect “prevailed at a time when the police enjoyed 
greater public confidence,” when suspects “were more likely to be imagined as a 
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species apart,” and when confession was seen as “naturally born of remorse.”188 
The idea that defense counsel had a role during the interrogation process was 
rejected out of hand: “[A]ny lawyer worth his salt” would tell his client not to 
cooperate.189 
By the time the Court decided Miranda, attitudes towards police and suspects 
had changed radically.190 Because a person who confesses does so contrary to 
self-interest, the extraction of a confession must be the product of a will 
overborne by the police.191 The new explanation for why someone might confess 
was that confessions must be the product of unfair practices by the police.192 
Further, society’s view of suspects transformed as well: they were not seen as 
lower moral beings and procedures that treated suspects as such demeaned 
suspects’ dignity.193 
Questioning Miranda recognized how this change of view came about. 
Starting with cases like Brown v. Mississippi, Jerry traced the Court’s 
involvement in trying to mitigate the effect of racial prejudice and the use of the 
third degree.194 But the Supreme Court’s case law continued to evolve, even in 
cases where suspects were not subjected to physical violence and where their 
confessions were not likely unreliable.195 The Court focused not only on 
reliability but also on police conduct, with the suggestion that some practices 
were simply unfair.196 
Unlike most commentators, Jerry found the voluntariness test worthy of 
some praise.197 Critics have found that the test “made ‘[a]lmost everything . . . 
relevant, but almost nothing . . . decisive.’”198 Jerry argued that police recognized 
some conduct, like “prolonged detention, relay questioning, threats or other 
intimidation, promises of benefit, [or] denial of food or sleep,” would lead to 
suppression of a suspect’s confession.199 Jerry concluded that the voluntariness 
test represented a form of “shrewd and responsible pragmatism.”200 That was so at 
a time when participants in the system could not agree on principles that should 
be applied.201 Importantly, he argued by the 1960s, the extreme practices used by 
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police in earlier cases were used less frequently and that “the police were 
operating with far greater sensitivity to constitutional requirements.”202 
Questioning Miranda also reviewed the short history of the role of counsel in 
the stationhouse and argued that the idea had little historical or legal authority.203 
At the same time, consistent with changing views of criminals (with greater 
sympathy and recognition of the role of poverty and environment), the Court 
began to change its view of the need for counsel in that setting.204 Cases decided 
prior to Miranda, most notably Escobedo, as Jerry noted, suggested a long-
standing right to counsel: 
Responding to the charge that the presence of counsel would eliminate 
all interrogation, the Court countered: “[I]f the exercise of constitutional 
rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then 
there is something very wrong with that system.” This statement is 
misleading because the right that the Court was defending, far from 
being of long standing, was newly discovered, indeed created, in this 
very opinion.205 
Not only was the right newly created, it was also ill-defined. What would the 
role of counsel be during interrogation?206 It might have been to sit with the 
accused during interrogation, although Jerry doubted that.207 Instead, he 
concluded that counsel would bring the interrogation to a close.208 Jerry saw that 
result as creating more crime as a result of fewer confessions.209 Given his doubts 
about Escobedo, his unfavorable views about Miranda were not surprising. 
He found Miranda’s reliance on the Fifth Amendment largely unwarranted.210 
Apart from questions about the basis of the right to counsel during interrogation, 
he raised questions about the breadth of the right to remain silent.211 Specifically, 
he questioned whether a defendant asked merely one question without warnings 
(e.g., “Where were you last night?”) was coerced.212 He located in Miranda a new 
view of the custodial interrogation process: “[T]he very fact of custodial 
questioning [was] a grave threat to ‘rational judgment’ that induced the 
 
202. Id. at 1433. 
203. Id. at 1438. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 1440. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 1441. 
210. Id. at 1446. 
211. Id. at 1450. 
212. Id. at 1461. 
2014 / Reflections on an Extraordinary Career 
480 
‘abdication of the constitutional privilege.’”213 This view was a new 
understanding of the balance between “the autonomy of the individual and 
concern for the protection of the general public,” a radical position adopted for 
the first time in Miranda.214 Further, Jerry noted that the Court was unclear on the 
role of counsel, but he expected the newly created right to counsel to dry up 
confessions.215 
One major contribution of Questioning Miranda is its analysis of the 
concerns that underpin Miranda: notably, it was grounded in the notion of the 
sporting theory of justice and principles of equality.216 Jerry argued that the new 
rules were too generous to the suspect: What is wrong, he asked, with asking a 
suspect to answer truthfully?217 Even if a suspect may have reasons not to respond 
candidly, the government has a justified reason to ask.218 And outside the context 
of criminal justice, society routinely expects people to provide explanations of 
their behavior, even to their detriment.219 Jerry found the sporting theory of 
justice too generous to the suspect.220 
Jerry also identified and questioned the Court’s concerns about equality that 
seem to undergird Miranda. In effect, the Court believed that “[s]uspects who do 
not know their rights, or do not assert them, as a consequence of some 
handicap—poverty, lack of education, emotional instability—should not . . . fare 
worse than more accomplished suspects who know and have the capacity to 
assert their rights.”221 But if the concern is equality of treatment, he doubted that 
the solution for inequality was to make it easier for less capable suspects to 
escape punishment.222 The alternative would be to find ways to bring the hardier 
suspects to bar: identifying the guilty would benefit society.223 
The focus on equality also ignored a basic principle: “[G]uilt is personal.”224 
Because a similarly situated offender got away with murder does not make a 
suspect less guilty of murder.225 In effect, the Court chose the wrong remedy 
based on the wrong right.226 
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His final criticisms about Miranda were pragmatic: he argued that by 1966, 
police practices had improved and were less likely to produce false 
confessions.227 He saw Miranda “as an exaggerated response to the times . . . . 
Miranda was a child of the racially troubled 1960’s and our tragic legacy of 
slavery.”228 At the time, many viewed the government as the cause of racism and 
poverty, and saw criminals, not as free will actors, but as the product of poverty 
or race or both.229 
He also reviewed empirical studies conducted post-Miranda. He raised 
concerns about the cost to society of lost convictions.230 
The cost was too great: the Court’s decisions like Escobedo and Miranda 
imposed “a serious handicap on the government” beyond the need to curb police 
abuses.231 The decisions were too distrustful of the police. They also ignored the 
importance of confessions, which “implicate[] social values, the existence of an 
integrated, shared network of values . . . .”232 Jerry placed the decisions within 
historical context: our nation was living through a period of “a decline of 
confidence in public purposes.” 233 
As developed below, when I first read Jerry’s article, what I found most 
notable was his discussion of the “[l]ess potent medicine . . . at hand”:234 other 
options that would have properly balanced the competing interests at stake in the 
interrogation process. His suggestions strike me as having real teeth. He 
suggested that the Court might have required that the state prove voluntariness 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it could have “added teeth” to the test by 
creating some per se rules, which would have forbidden specified practices.235 He 
included two notable suggestions of practices that might have been forbidden, 
including an outer time limit for questioning suspects and the presence of a 
neutral observer from the community.236 After all, at least for the federal system, 
the Court had crafted a remedy when federal agents failed to take a suspect 
before a magistrate for a prompt arraignment: statements taken during a period of 
unnecessary delay were suppressed.237 He also observed that videotaping 
interrogations was then within the capacity of the police and would allow 
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creation of an adequate record from which to determine the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s confession.238 
Jerry did not want to give the government the power to extract confessions 
“forcibly and indecently,” but he believed in the need for the government’s 
obligation to segregate dangerous people from the rest of society.239 
I draw a number of lessons from Questioning Miranda. The lack of stridency 
in Jerry’s work makes it eminently readable, increasing its chances of persuading 
readers. Beyond that, though, several important principles animate the article. No 
doubt, Jerry did not burn his draft card and did not believe in the radical critique 
of American values and economy. Instead, Questioning Miranda demonstrates 
concern about the community and a belief in the American system.240 But unlike 
some on the right, Jerry did not believe that criminals were incapable of 
rehabilitation, or that they were a species apart from “normal” members of 
society.241 Instead, he saw confession as part of the process toward reform and the 
reentry into society. As he stated, confessions implicate “social values, the 
existence of an integrated, shared network of values . . . .”242 While Questioning 
Miranda does not discuss how to reform inequities caused by poverty and racism, 
Jerry’s work with Legal Services Corporation suggests concern for the indigent 
members of society.243 He argues that letting violent criminals free in the name of 
equality, because wealthier, more informed individuals could go free too, is the 
wrong way to reform inequality.244 
In addition to his view that confessions represent an important part of 
rehabilitation, Jerry argued that Miranda ignored the social necessity of 
protecting society from violent dangerous offenders in favor of protecting the 
constitutional rights of criminal suspects.245 The Constitution did not dictate the 
result in Miranda and, in fact, the decision was a radical departure from the 
Constitution and case law governing confessions.246 
Unlike some supporters of the police, however, Jerry argued for meaningful 
limits on the police. By comparison, when one canvasses the views of, for 
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist, one is hard-pressed to find instances in which 
he voted to limit police conduct.247 Other right-leaning justices, like Justice 
 
238. Id. at 1474–75. 
239. Id. at 1475–76. 
240. Id. at 1471. 
241. Id. at 1424, 1426. 
242. Id. at 1472. 
243. Supra Part II. 
244. Caplan, supra note 4, at 1456–58. 
245. Id. at 1467. 
246. Id. at 1470. 
247. Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 
IND. L. J. 273, 278 (1987). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
483 
Scalia, may be less predictable in always finding against criminal defendants.248 
But Justice Scalia, like Chief Justice Rehnquist, almost always reads the Fifth 
Amendment, Miranda, voluntariness, and the Sixth Amendment narrowly.249 
Right-leaning scholars like Cassell show relatively little interest in limiting police 
practices.250 
As developed in more detail in the next section,251 Jerry understood the inside 
workings of the police. Appointed to review police practices in a number of high-
visibility situations, Jerry earned the enmity of some pro-police advocates.252 
Questioning Miranda demonstrates a similar sense of balance: his inside 
information made him aware of the realities of police practices. 
His insider’s view of police practices is evident in a couple of instances in 
Questioning Miranda. Initially, he argued that at the time of Miranda, police had 
already abandoned some of the most egregious methods of interrogation.253 But 
he was no knee-jerk defender of the police: the remedies that he proposed had 
teeth. He was not merely urging that the Court return to the pre-Warren Court 
voluntariness standard. Further, he went far beyond merely recommending that 
interrogations be tape-recorded.254 In addition to recommending videotaping, he 
argued in favor of some per se practices that would be disallowed. 
One example is particularly telling. Questioning Miranda argued that the 
Court could have made its holdings in cases arising under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure the constitutional norm.255 In two earlier cases, the Court held 
that the police must take a suspect before a magistrate (where he would be 
appointed counsel) without unnecessary delay.256 In the second of those two 
cases, the Court presumed that a delay of more than six hours between arrest and 
 
248. For example, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment views seemingly swing between pro-police and 
pro-defendant positions. See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The 
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friends of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184 (2005); see 
also David G. Savage, Criminal Defendants Find an Unlikely Friend in Justice Scalia, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 24, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/24/nation/la-na-court-scalia-20111125. (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
249. See Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 
5–7 (2001). 
250. Cassell, supra note 177, at 912. 
251. Infra Part IV. 
252. See PHILA. POLICE STUDY TASKFORCE, supra note 21; Evaluation Design for Operation Rollout, 
supra note 21; see also Letter from Jerome A. Barron to Gerald M. Caplan, supra note 21. 
253. Caplan, supra note 4, at 1444. 
254. By contrast, that is, basically, Professor Cassell’s only alternative to Miranda. See Cassell, supra 
note  164, at 258. No doubt, taping provides significant protection to both police and suspects. It does not solve 
the entire problem. As demonstrated elsewhere, one’s observations of the same facts does not always lead to the 
same conclusions. Depending on the level of review on appeal, a trial court’s determination that a confession is 
voluntary may be determinative. 
255. Caplan, supra note 4, at 1474. 
256. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 349  (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 
(1957). 
2014 / Reflections on an Extraordinary Career 
484 
court appearance was per se an unnecessary delay, which should result in 
suppression of a statement taken during that period of time.257 Interestingly, some 
liberal commentators who criticized Miranda as not going far enough argued that 
the McNabb-Mallory rule provided the suspect greater protection than did 
Miranda.258 Jerry did not foresee all of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ efforts 
to limit Miranda, but surely when he wrote Questioning Miranda he was aware 
of many of those new rules. Despite that, he urged vigorous alternatives. I read 
him as legitimately concerned about limiting police practices, not just giving the 
police a carte blanche to secure confessions. 
As with my earlier discussion of Jerry’s work as interim director of the Legal 
Services Corporation,259 perhaps all I have proven is that Jerry is a moderate or 
closet liberal. Here again, a comparison to traditional conservative values that 
were in evidence before the modern era of talk radio and radical right extremism 
is worthwhile. 
There is an odd contradiction in the writings of some contemporary right-
leaning commentators, who seem to flirt with libertarian thought when it comes 
to economic liberty, but who want to give a great deal of power to the police.260 
That is not classic conservative thought. Remember that Burke, according to his 
recent biographer Jesse Norman, would have rejected a selfish society as one that 
“causes people to lose sight of the real social sources of human well-being and to 
become more selfish and individualistic . . . .”261 As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
argued, Burke believed in a society “where power implies responsibility and 
where all classes should be united in harmonious union by a sense of common 
trust and mutual obligation.”262 
Questioning Miranda reflects those values. Jerry’s belief in democratic 
institutions is reflected in his article. He believes that those institutions advance 
the public good.263 He believes in the role of the police; but he also believes that 
any institution, including the police, needs restraints.264 Because the police are 
granted significant power, the courts have an obligation to limit the abuse of that 
power, but not to erode it beyond recognition.265 As developed below,266 Jerry’s 
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view of the Fourth Amendment underscored this view of the role of government. 
In effect, Questioning Miranda demonstrated a belief in good government, one 
capable of protecting the public within meaningful constraints. 
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Throughout Jerry’s career, he moved in and out of positions dealing with the 
criminal justice system. For example, he served as an Assistant United States 
Attorney; he was staff attorney for the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice; he was a consultant to the Police Foundation 
and the President’s Commission on Organized Crime; he was the General 
Counsel to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; he served as the 
Director of the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force; and he was a consultant to 
the United States Department of Justice while it was evaluating the use of deadly 
force by the police in Los Angeles County.267 And these are only a few examples 
of his work in criminal justice.268 
I want to focus on one other position that he held that has special significance 
for this article. During the early 1970s, Jerry was General Counsel to the 
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia.269 In that role, he 
developed guidelines for the Metropolitan Police Department.270 Jerry’s 
motivation for that kind of activity and the rules that he promulgated make an 
important point about criminal justice and also demonstrate his conservative 
views about social order.271 Despite differences with some of his conclusions, I 
find much to respect in those views. 
This part reviews Jerry’s views of the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice and his views on rulemaking.272 It then turns to 
some of the specific rules that he promulgated for the Metropolitan Police 
Department.273 In discussing those rules, I focus on his disagreement with the 
exclusionary rule and his insider’s view of police practices.274 The article then 
turns to two Supreme Court cases that led to expanded police power: one arising 
out of the District of Columbia where the rules that he helped craft were in place, 
and one from Florida where no similar constraints were in place.275 I finish by 
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exploring some of the advantages of his approach to administrative rulemaking, 
rather than Court-dictated mandates for police practices.276 
A. The Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 
As a young professor at Arizona State, Jerry wrote a detailed insider’s 
account of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal 
Justice.277 His article traced the nationalization of crime, largely the result of 
rising crime rates during the 1960s and, ironically, of efforts by Presidential 
candidate Barry Goldwater to make crime a campaign issue in the 1964 
presidential election.278 Despite doubts about an expanded federal role, President 
Johnson created the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice to counter Senator Goldwater’s challenge on the crime issue.279 
The President’s response included the creation of the National Crime 
Commission (the Commission) and the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which 
funneled federal money to local law enforcement.280 At the time, few on the right 
objected to the expanded role of the federal government.281 The Commission was 
more controversial. 
The Commission’s report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, was the 
major legacy of the Commission.282 It included more than 200 
recommendations.283 Despite his work on the Commission, Jerry’s support for the 
report was lukewarm, at best. The Commission’s recommendations were 
“surprisingly liberal.”284 “Almost without exception, the Commission avoided the 
‘get tough’ proposals routinely featured in the media, and included only a few 
measures sought by law enforcement officials.”285 Jerry implicitly chided the 
Commission because it “shied away from taking a position.”286 Notably, it 
“skirted the hottest issue of all: the impact of Supreme Court decisions on the 
police. Many citizens wondered whether the Court was in fact handcuffing the 
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cops,”287 but the majority of the Commission members disagreed and did not take 
on the issue.288 
Many of the Commission’s recommendations reflected liberal assumptions 
about the crime problem. For example, several of its recommendations focused 
on crime prevention and support for institutions other than criminal justice 
institutions to address underlying social conditions that lead to crime.289 The 
Commission demonstrated a belief that the war on poverty, inadequate housing, 
and unemployment was a war on crime.290 
Although Jerry had a different philosophical view of crime and criminals that 
emphasized personal responsibility,291 his criticism of the report was, in large 
part, pragmatic: at a time when many Americans were afraid to walk the streets, 
failing to recommend at least some get-tough-on-crime proposals “was an 
indefensible strategy.”292 Its failure “was also a dangerous strategy” because 
many of the Commission’s proposals were costly and, arguably, too rosy. 293 The 
result being that the Commission’s recommendations would be ignored.294 
Jerry identified other pragmatic problems with implementation of the 
proposals. Notably, the Commission lacked the knowledge of who would 
implement the proposals.295 Jerry suggested that the proposals lacked an 
understanding of political power296 and that there was no way to weed out 
“unrealistic or utopian notions.”297 Among the problems Jerry identified was that 
the Commission did not consider how to “stimulate . . . to action” groups like law 
enforcement officials, who were likely to be unreceptive to many of the 
recommendations.298 
Jerry also reviewed a second initiative that was part of President Johnson’s 
response to crime in the streets.299 The Law Enforcement Assistance Act created 
the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (which eventually became the Law 
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Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)).300 He argued that the LEAA 
was more responsive to public concerns about street crime.301 His article reviewed 
grants made by the agency and gave a candid and balanced assessment, arguing 
in some instances that the funded projects were successful.302 But ultimately, he 
argued that the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance faced a dilemma: the 
agencies most in need of change, including the police, were the least likely to 
seek financial assistance.303 That was, in part, because few police chiefs were part 
of the legislative process, preventing them from buying into the goals of 
reform.304 However, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration replaced 
the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance. By the time of that change, “the 
rising flow of public concern over crime” changed the politics of federal 
assistance. 305 Police chiefs became more receptive to federal funding and came to 
recognize that their departments really are part of the criminal justice system.306 
I have included a somewhat detailed summary of Jerry’s views for a reason. 
It reflects his conservative views about criminal justice. He saw the police as 
others have called them, the Thin Blue Line,307 between criminals and innocent 
members of the public. His insider’s view demonstrated a pragmatic 
understanding of how to implement change, but also enthusiasm and support for 
the police. Those views were certainly at odds with liberals, who distrusted 
police and saw them as a threat to civil liberties.308 But as developed below,309 
Jerry’s views about the police were more nuanced than many, more gung-ho 
proponents of the police. No doubt, because Jerry lived inside the system, he 
appreciated its flaws, but understood how to improve that system. 
B. Administrative Remedies as a Means of Limiting the Police: Jerry’s 
Theoretical Argument 
Like many conservatives of his era (and today), Jerry disagreed with the 
Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio,310 which held that the exclusionary rule applied 
to the states to the same extent as it did to federal authorities.311 Its critics often 
 
300. Caplan, supra note 272, at 612. As indicated, Jerry served as General Counsel to the LEAA from 
1968–69. Resume of Gerald Caplan, supra note 1. 
301. Caplan, supra note 272, at 612. 
302. Id. at 616–17. 
303. Id. at 629. 
304. Id. at 633. 
305. Id. at 635. 
306. Id. 
307. THE THIN BLUE LINE (MGM 1988). 
308. See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2001). 
309. Infra Part IV.B–C. 
310. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
311. See Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW & 
 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
489 
focused on several major arguments. Mapp was decided by a razor thin 
majority,312 suggesting how radical a departure it was from the views of the Court 
in the recent past.313 Its critics claimed that Mapp was unwarranted as a matter of 
constitutional history.314 They doubted that it could effectively deter police 
misconduct, given that officers often made mistakes in good faith.315 Even if it 
could deter misconduct, the rule’s costs were too great and disproportionate: the 
release of dangerous criminals, even in cases where “the constable has 
blundered.”316 Further, the rule protects the guilty, not the innocent.317 Releasing 
the obviously guilty also produced cynicism among the police and the public.318 
Less clear is what Mapp’s critics would have substituted for the exclusionary 
rule. For example, in rejecting the application of the exclusionary rule only 
twelve years earlier, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado spoke in general terms about 
equally effective alternatives.319 In rejecting the need to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment through the use of the exclusionary rule, Justice Frankfurter 
concluded: 
We cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to 
remand such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless from a 
search, to the remedies of private action and such protection as the 
internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, 
may afford.320 
But his discussion of state practice did not offer much support for the view 
that any of these remedies was particularly effective.321 
Even the dissenters in Mapp did not offer a strong argument that effective 
alternative remedies were in place. The dissent focused primarily on judicial 
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restraint322 and federalism concerns,323 with little focus on remedies in place in the 
states.324 
Warren Burger, Chief Justice Warren’s replacement, was appointed in part 
because he was a strident critic of Mapp.325 Despite his criticisms of Mapp, when 
the Court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment created a federal tort when 
federal officials violated the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Burger dissented 
from the Court’s holding that the Fourth Amendment did so.326 His criticism of 
the exclusionary rule and his lack of support for one plausible alternative 
remedy—tort damages—suggest that Burger did not see much need for an 
effective remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.327 One suspects that many of 
Mapp’s critics were content to give police wide berth in fighting crime with few 
meaningful checks on their power. 
As observed, Jerry disagreed with Mapp’s holding. He objected on a number 
of grounds. Unlike some critics who saw Mapp as unwarranted as a matter of 
constitutional law, Jerry focused primarily on pragmatic grounds.328 He saw 
“judicial activism” as a reaction to the lack of effective action on the part of the 
executive branch.329 But appellate courts are not well-situated to make law and 
can have been seen as serving a “‘backstopping role.’”330 Day-to-day, police 
officers face a wide variety of situations that the appellate courts cannot 
anticipate.331 
Beyond the limited capacity for lawmaking, appellate courts often produced 
rules that police resented. Police often saw cases like Mapp as making the street 
officer’s job unnecessarily difficult.332 Resenting the uninformed intrusion by the 
courts, officers sometimes felt justified in subverting the rules.333 For example, 
after Mapp, apparently many police officers, now constrained in searching 
 
322. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
323. Id. at 678–680 (discussing why the Fourth Amendment should not apply through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the States). 
324. Id. at 681–682. 
325. See Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964); see also Jesse 
H. Choper, The Burger Court: Misperceptions Regarding Judicial Restraint and Insensitivity to Individual 
Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 767, 767 (1979) (explaining that Nixon chose Burger to replace Warren in an 
effort to promote judicial restraint). 
326. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) 
(Burger, J., dissenting). 
327. Id. at 422. 
328. See Caplan, supra note 311, at 500–501 (explaining some disenchantment with the exclusionary 
rule). 
329. Id. at 505. 
330. Id. (citing Amsterdam, supra note 311, at 790). 
331. Id. at 506. 
332. Id. at 502 (noting that department rules are easier for officers to follow than court decisions and 
statutes). 
333. Id. at 503 (observing that with rules in place, the court no longer finds against the officer personally, 
but against his department, thus offering the officer more individual protection). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
491 
suspicious individuals, testify that, upon approaching suspects, the suspects 
abandon drugs.334 
Having judges imposing rules on the police worked against more sensible 
regulation of police conduct. As Jerry argued, “[h]istorically, law enforcement 
agencies have been neither bold nor vigorous in the development of policy.”335 
That is so because the police “have responded to the dictates of others, most 
notably the judiciary, rather than acting as initiators of policies.”336 In instances 
where police have developed policies, for example, in reaction to a judicial 
decision, the resulting policies have often been loose and vague.337 But Jerry 
made a significant contribution, both in writing about rulemaking for law 
enforcement agencies and in doing it at the ground level. 
In The Case for Rulemaking By Law Enforcement Agencies, Jerry argued that 
“some notable exceptions . . . demonstrate that rulemaking is a feasible approach 
to upgrading the quality of criminal investigation.”338 He cited the specific orders 
promulgated for the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia 
as such an example.339 And, of course, he played a major role in drafting those 
guidelines.340 
The argument in favor of agency rulemaking has some similarities with the 
arguments in favor of bright line rules,341 with some key differences. Importantly, 
rulemaking should be done by police departments, not by the courts, as in the 
case of many bright line rules worked out in Supreme Court opinions.342 The 
result is that, unlike judicial decisions that are not likely to offer clear guidance 
or to be based on day-to-day experiences of the police, the rules would be 
“formulated in categories meaningful to a policeman.”343 Reliance on rulemaking 
places the focus on the top officials as long as the police officer followed the 
departmental rules.344 
Rulemaking can anticipate cases that may arise in the courts. Without 
rulemaking, police act consistent with their general sense of the law, with the 
possibility that a court will determine later that the police erred.345 By contrast, 
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because police officials are familiar with issues that arise on a day-to-day basis, 
they can anticipate the need for rules governing police conduct before the matter 
is adjudicated.346 
Jerry cited one instance of effective rulemaking that influenced a United 
States court of appeals. The rule in place in the District of Columbia restricted 
“‘on-and near-the-scene identification confrontations to suspects arrested within 
60 minutes after the alleged offense and in close proximity to the scene.’”347 
Commending the regulation as “a careful and commendable administrative effort 
to balance” competing interests, the D.C. Circuit concluded that, “[w]e see no 
need for interposing at this time any more rigid time standard by judicial 
declaration.”348 
While police officials typically created rules because of judicial decisions, 
Jerry argued that the trend might reverse: effective rulemaking may, he opined, 
lead to more sympathetic treatment by the courts.349 Further, rulemaking should 
“serve to reduce the uneven enforcement that now characterizes so much of street 
policing.”350 
Jerry also argued for a diminished role for the exclusionary rule. The court 
would apply the exclusionary rule only if a court were to find that the policy was 
deficient.351 Further, effective internal disciplinary policies “might be a basis for 
discarding the principle of excluding evidence altogether.”352 
Many participants in the criminal justice system, especially liberals, may 
question Jerry’s optimistic assessment that police departments would follow 
through with effective rulemaking.353 No doubt, at times, Jerry must have 
questioned whether he was too supportive of the police. For example, his 
investigations of the Philadelphia and Los Angeles police departments pulled no 
punches.354 He found plenty to criticize in both departments.355 
Apart from whether Jerry may be too supportive of police, I want to explore 
in more detail one of the rules that Jerry helped promulgate for the District of 
Columbia police and its interesting history in the Supreme Court. 
 
346. Id. at 505, 507. 
347. Id. at 504 (quoting United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
348. Id. at 504 (quoting Perry, 449 F.2d at 1037). 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. at 510. 
352. Id. 
353. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). 
354. See PHILA. POLICE STUDY TASKFORCE, supra note 21, at 16 (“Our other observation is that there is 
considerable room for improvement in the kind and quality of policing provided to Philadelphia. To us, the 
Philadelphia Police Department’s development as an effective, modern department seems arrested.”); 
Evaluation Design for Operation Rollout, supra note 21. 
355. See PHILA. POLICE STUDY TASKFORCE, supra note 21, at 16; Evaluation Design for Operation 
Rollout, supra note 21. 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
493 
C. Administrative Remedies as a Means of Limiting the Police: In Practice 
I have always thought that United States v. Robinson356 was a bad decision. 
Although the trend began a year earlier in Chambers v. Maroney,357Robinson 
ushered in the era of “bright line” fever.358 In a series of cases, the Warren Court 
had effectively limited the term “reasonable” within the Fourth Amendment. 
According to the Court, the basic premise was that police needed probable cause 
and a search warrant, unless a case came within a narrow exception.359 Further, in 
defining “reasonable” exceptions or in assessing the reasonableness of police 
conduct, the Warren Court limited the scope of police conduct by tying their 
conduct to the underlying circumstances.360 Hence, in a case like Chimel v. 
California,361 a search incident to a lawful arrest was confined to the immediate 
area around the arrestee. That was so because a search incident to a lawful arrest 
was justified by the need to protect the arresting officers and to protect against a 
suspect trying to destroy evidence.362 
That approach started to change with Robinson. There, an officer arrested the 
defendant for operating his vehicle with a suspended license.363 The officer 
testified that he did not fear for his safety.364 Further, the officer had no need to 
protect against destruction of evidence of the offense of arrest: the suspect would 
not have evidence on his person that he was driving on a suspended license.365 
Even further, when the officer searched the defendant, he found a crumpled up 
cigarette packet and instead of searching it, he could easily have placed it beyond 
the defendant’s reach. Instead, opening the packet, he discovered gelatin capsules 
of heroin.366 
Relying on the approach taken during the Warren Court, the lower court 
found that the search exceeded the scope of a proper search incident to a lawful 
arrest.367 The Supreme Court reversed. At root, the Court found a need for a clear 
rule: although the Court made a weak effort to tie its holding to precedent, which 
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it conceded was “sketchy,”368 it rejected the need for “case-by-case 
adjudication.”369 The fact of an arrest, without more, determined the right to 
conduct a full search of the arrestee.370 Untying the meaning of “reasonableness” 
from the underlying rationale for the rule has led to a significant expansion of 
police power.371 
Having taught Robinson for years, I realized only in more recent years that 
Robinson could have been constrained and that Gustafson v. Florida,372and not 
Robinson, was the more troubling case. Few case books use Gustafson, and some 
may not even cite the decision in a discussion of Robinson.373 Gustafson seems at 
first blush to follow logically from the Court’s fuller discussion of the issue in 
Robinson.374 
Robinson arose in the District of Columbia. In effect at the time were the 
regulations that Jerry had helped promulgate.375 Notably, if an officer made a full 
custodial arrest, “standard operating procedures” required the officer to perform 
“a full ‘field type search.’”376 By comparison, the officer in Gustafson was not so 
constrained.377 
The Robinson majority made a point of the existence of the regulations.378 
That made the Court’s decision more palatable: in Robinson, the officer was 
acting entirely reasonably because he was doing what he was trained to do and 
so, the Court might have been suggesting, finding that the officer exceeded his 
authority would be unreasonable. The officer was doing his job. Or one could 
paraphrase Detective Friday: “Just the rules, ma’am.”379 
No one reading Robinson misses the subtext: the suspect, driving a Cadillac 
in the District of Columbia, was black; the officer was probably white.380 As 
became more apparent during the 1990s, black motorists believe with good 
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reason that they are singled out for arbitrary treatment by the police.381 One virtue 
of the regulation in place in the District of Columbia was that it limited an 
officer’s discretion. He had to do a full search when he was arresting a person 
without regard to race.382 While the search might have exceeded the underlying 
justification if narrowly construed, the regulation was a step toward limiting 
arbitrariness by the police. 
But the Court did not choose that route. Instead, as indicated above, it moved 
seamlessly from Robinson to Gustafson, treating the two cases as 
indistinguishable, even though the officer in Gustafson was not constrained by 
similar regulations.383 Distinguishing the two cases would have given incentive to 
police to develop guidelines with effective internal consequences for their 
violation along the lines that Jerry suggested. As discussed above, that would 
have provided some limits on what is “reasonable.”384 Observers of the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts’ Courts have noticed that instead, “reasonableness” 
seems to have evolved into a green light for the police.385 
Racial profiling is an area where Jerry’s rulemaking approach has proven to 
be an effective alternative to Court action. Over a couple of decades, the Court 
seemed to suggest that an officer’s motive in conducting a search was relevant to 
the legality of the officer’s conduct. In Chimel, for example, the Court seemed 
troubled by the fact that officers timed their arrest of the defendant so that they 
could conduct a full search of his home as a search incident to his arrest.386 
Elsewhere, the Court had stated, for example, that “an inventory search must not 
be used as a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminatory 
evidence.”387 In other cases, the Court upheld police conduct because the record 
did not demonstrate bad faith388 or that the police conduct did not seem to be a 
pretext to avoid the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.389 
The Court squarely addressed the issue of racial profiling in Whren v. United 
States.390 There, the record spoke strongly of an improper use of traffic laws to 
stop a black male, whom the officer suspected of drug activity.391 But a 
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unanimous Court held that the motive of the officer in making the stop was 
irrelevant.392 The Court judged the police conduct from an objective standard: Did 
the suspect violate the traffic law, allowing the lawful stop?393 
Anyone familiar with the wide range of traffic offenses and the ease with 
which an officer can stop virtually any motorist based on a violation recognizes 
the power acceded to the police.394 But cases like Whren allow police to stop 
whomever they choose with virtually no Fourth Amendment protection.395 The 
Fourth Amendment does not check an officer’s discretion, allowing conduct that 
is entirely discriminatory and, therefore, unreasonable. 
In part because civil rights groups have raised the issue, some local and state 
governments have addressed concerns about racial profiling.396 Whether police 
officials would have acted on their own without those efforts is unclear. But in 
response to pressure from the public, some police departments have developed 
regulations limiting racial profiling.397 
My views differ from Jerry’s. As do many liberals, I have less faith in the 
willingness of the police to self-regulate. I doubt that many current reforms 
would be in place without the exclusionary rule.398 But the point of this article is 
not to explore my differences with Jerry’s positions. Instead, this article focuses 
on Jerry’s conservative views. Once again, in the area of the Fourth Amendment, 
he parted company with liberals, who were especially active in his early career.399 
His views were, however, consistent with several traditional conservative 
principles.400 
Today, many on the right cite President Reagan’s statement that government 
is not the answer; instead it is the problem.401 That is not traditional conservatism. 
 
392. Id. at 812. 
393. Id. at 819. 
394. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001); see also State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 
343, 346 (1999). 
395. 517 U.S. at 819. 
396. See, e.g., 2009 N.J. REG. TEXT 170662 (NS); 2009 WI REG. TEXT 197250 (NS). 
397. See, e.g., ERIC J. FRITSCH & CHAD R. TRULSON, DUNCANVILLE POLICE DEPT. RACIAL PROFILING 
ANALYSIS (2012) (noting that the police department has a regulation, 5.41, that prohibits racial profiling of any 
sort). 
398. See Michael Vitiello, Herring v. United States: Mapp’s “Artless” Overruling?, 10 NEV. L.J. 164 
(2009); Michael Vitiello & Jane C. Burger, Mapp’s Exclusionary Rule: Is the Court Crying Wolf?, 86 
DICKERSON L. REV. 15 (1981). 
399. The period of time between Mapp and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), was a liberal 
heyday. Beginning with Mapp and ending with Duncan, the Court held virtually all of the protections in the Bill 
of Rights applicable to the states. See, e.g., TOMKOVICZ & WHITE, supra note 373, at xiv–xv. 
400. Supra Part I. 
401. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981); see also Isaiah J. 
Poole, Paul Ryan Misses Top Reason We Haven’t ‘Won’ the War on Poverty, CAMPAIGN FOR AM.’S FUTURE 
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://ourfuture.org/20140304/paul-ryan-misses-top-reason-we-havent-won-the-war-on-poverty 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (comparing Paul Ryan to Reagan and the “government is the problem” 
mentality). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
497 
While traditional conservatives favor smaller government, they favor good 
government and see the need for governmental institutions.402 Consistent with 
those principles, Jerry favored vigorous police departments as necessary to 
protect the public.403 His work in the criminal justice system led him to appreciate 
the efforts of the police and to see many of them as hardworking honorable men 
and women. But his insider’s view also taught him the need to regulate police 
conduct. Excluding reliable evidence at trial seemed to extract too high a cost.404 
At the same time, his remedy of internal police regulations may work effectively 
to guide police discretion and to protect the public from arbitrary police power.405 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
A quick look at the author’s note in a number of my articles reflects my debt 
to Jerry.406 He has generously reviewed drafts of my articles and offered 
extremely helpful comments. Most often, he has offered important insights from 
a thoughtful conservative prospective. He has deepened my understanding of 
police practices. At the same time, he has not been a hard-edged zealot. Had 
President George W. Bush not co-opted the title, I might be tempted to call Jerry 
a compassionate conservative. 
Again, despite evidence that President Bush was an extremist in many 
areas,
407
 Jerry’s views were much more consonant with traditional conservatism. 
As his work with the Corporation demonstrated, he believed in the positive role 
of government in helping those in need and in restraining the power of 
government.408 He did not believe in letting the less fortunate individuals make it 
on their own.409 He believed in the shared sense of responsibility and saw value in 
integrating all members into the larger community.410 
In areas of criminal justice, he understood and sympathized with the police.411 
He worked closely with police agencies. He saw the day-to-day efforts of the 
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police to protect society from dangerous felons. But he was no blind advocate for 
uncontrolled police power.412 
Anyone who listens to talk radio or reads about the dysfunction of 
government recognizes how far the right wing has departed from traditional 
conservative values.413 Having more Jerry Caplan’s working in the public sector 
would be a great addition to the tone and intelligence of public discourse. And 
even more importantly from my perspective, his retirement leaves the legal 
academy a less congenial place. Jerry, I salute you. 
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